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**1. USSR REFUSES TO PARTICIPATE IN FURTHER TALKS
IN PRESENT UN DISARMAMENT BODIES**

25X1A Comment on:

[REDACTED] Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov's statement before the UN General Assembly Political Committee on 4 November that the USSR "will not participate in the UN Disarmament Commission and its subcommittee in their present form" probably was intended to block approval of the Western-backed 24-nation proposal calling on the subcommittee to resume negotiations as soon as possible. Kuznetsov's hint that the USSR might be satisfied with a compromise between the present subcommittee and the Soviet proposal for a new commission composed of all 82 UN members suggests that the USSR is seeking to capitalize on dissatisfaction among UN members over the lack of progress in the subcommittee in order to win support of neutralist states, particularly India, which favor expanding the present disarmament machinery.

The Soviet leaders, who since last summer have strongly criticized the work of the subcommittee, appear confident that any expansion of the present machinery would work to their advantage, particularly in increasing pressure on the West to accept Soviet proposals for a suspension of nuclear tests and a five-year renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. It is possible that Kuznetsov's declaration may convince many UN members that a showdown vote on the 24-power resolution should be avoided by using the procedural device of sending all proposals to the Disarmament Commission, where further efforts to expand its membership could be made. [REDACTED]

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2. YUGOSLAV OFFICIAL HINTS AT REAPPRAISAL OF SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS

25X1A Comment on:


Jose Vilfan, confidant of President Tito, on 1 November told the US chargé in Belgrade that there had been no prior indications that Soviet boss Khrushchev would "upset the balance of power within the Kremlin," and intimated that a "reappraisal of the Yugoslav analysis" is required now that he has done so. High Yugoslav officials had previously indicated their anti-

pathy to one-man rule in the USSR and their support for the Khrushchev-Zhukov "team." Zhukov was considered a force that augured well for stability.

Vilfan implies that the ouster of Zhukov stems primarily from a Khrushchev-Zhukov rivalry. Apparently the general view in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry is that Khrushchev's precarious hold on the Soviet central committee forced him to cooperate with a Stalinist wing which had initiated Zhukov's removal. The Yugoslav radio, according to the Times correspondent in Belgrade, announced on 2 November that it was Party Secretary Mikhail Suslov--a Stalinist in Yugoslav eyes--who delivered the final report before the Soviet central committee on the Zhukov ouster. This explanation is more consistent with the view long held in Belgrade that Khrushchev faces serious opposition in the party and requires all possible support for his policies if he is to overcome his opponents. Belgrade's concern will probably induce increased caution in its relations with the USSR.

3. DEATH OF DI VITTORIO WEAKENS ITALIAN COMMUNIST LABOR LEADERSHIP


25X1A Comment on:




The death on 3 November of Giuseppe Di Vittorio, secretary general of the Communist-dominated Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL) since 1946,

leaves it without a strong popular leader in the face of an internal crisis and lessening control over Italian labor.

In the past year the CGIL's membership has dropped about 200,000 and in 1957 for the first time it has won less than 50 percent of the posts in shop steward elections. Nenni Socialist members have become increasingly critical of the CGIL's subservience to the Communist line and failure to press for immediate workers' benefits. Partly in response to this criticism, Di Vittorio said in August 1956 that the CGIL should become independent of all political parties.


The Italian Communist party is faced with a dilemma in its choice for a replacement. If it backs a dependable Communist such as CGIL Secretary Secondo Pessi, it risks further straining relations with the Nenni Socialist members and worsening morale of the rank and file, with whom Pessi is unpopular. If it backs a Nenni Socialist such as Secretary Fernando Santi, it risks a further divergence of CGIL and Communist party policies. A compromise candidate might be Communist Senator Renaldo Bitossi, another CGIL secretary, who appears to be better qualified and more popular than Pessi but does not stand as well with the party leadership. 

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
4. ISRAEL AGAIN TO SEEK HEAVY US ARMS

25X1A Comment on:



Israel has decided to approach the United States again for heavy arms, including the latest jet fighters and possibly submarines, [REDACTED]

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French Mystere jet fighters which Israel now has are definitely inferior to the MIG-19's with which Israel believes Egypt is already or may soon be equipped, and that while Israel's "need" for submarines could be criticized on military grounds, submarines would be expected to have a deterrent psychological effect on Arab countries. [REDACTED]

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An Israeli approach to the United States-- possibly a pro forma preliminary to obtaining additional arms from Western Europe-- would be part of a renewed effort to balance the Soviet arms in Arab hands. This effort probably is spurred by the uninterrupted trend toward closer Syrian-Soviet military and economic collaboration. The Israelis may believe that with increasing Soviet assistance, Syria is well on the way toward becoming a threat comparable to that posed by Egypt before the Sinai campaign last year.

The Israelis almost certainly are soliciting aid and advice from Western Europe as well as from the United States. On 5 November the chief of intelligence of the Israeli army is scheduled to begin a two-week visit to Italy, France, England, and perhaps Switzerland. [REDACTED]

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
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8. MEXICO'S NEXT PRESIDENT POSSIBLY ALREADY CHOSEN

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Comment on:



Adolfo Lopez Mateos, capable young minister of labor, appears almost sure to be named presidential candidate at the 15 November nominating convention of the Institutional Revolutionary party (PRI). Nomination by the PRI, the political composite which has governed Mexico under various names for almost 40 years, is tantamount to election. The voting will not take place until July 1958.

Most reports agree that President Ruiz Cortines has chosen Lopez Mateos as his successor, presumably after consultation with the two powerful former presidents of Mexico. Lazaro Cardenas, whose administration was highlighted by expropriation of foreign oil holdings in 1938, represents the nationalist, neutralist, leftist PRI wing. Miguel Aleman, who gave industrial development first priority during his presidential term (1946-52), speaks for the conservative groups who want to see Mexico's great economic progress of the last ten years maintained by an administration responsive to business interests. Both factions can find reason for support of Lopez Mateos in his record of mediation, praised by labor and management alike.

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